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ABSTRACT
Since the 1980’s, income inequality has increased markedly and is at the highest level ever since it
has been recorded in the U.S. This paper uses an overlapping-generations model with incomplete
markets that allows for household heterogeneity and that is calibrated to match the U.S. economy
with the purpose to study how skill-biased technological change (SBTC) and changes in taxation
quantitatively account for the increase in inequality from 1980 to 2010. We find that SBTC and
taxation decrease account for 48% of the total increase in the income Gini coefficient. In particular,
we conclude that SBTC alone accounted for 42% of the overall increase in income inequality, while
changes in the progressivity of the income tax schedule alone accounted for 5,7%.
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1 Introduction
Some argue that we are in the period of a “Forth Industrial Revolution”, which moved production
function shares. There is an increasing concern in the possible dominance of technology over
the human labor: “Automation and AI will lift productivity and economic growth, but millions of
people worldwide may need to switch occupations or upgrade skills” ( Manyika et al. (2017)).
Most of the literature focus on the substitution of low-skilled labor for capital (Autor et al.
(2003); Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018)). Although, it is essential to have in mind that high-skilled
automation can, and will probably be an issue due to artificial intelligence and machine learning.
Acemoglu and Restrepo (2016) describe: “If the long-run rental rate of capital relative to the wage
is sufficiently low, the long-run equilibrium involves automation of all tasks”.
Hence, as shown by Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018), low skill-automation will increase wage
inequality because people are being substituted by machines or losing their job. A social measure
to reduce inequality is using taxation. Saez (2001), claimed that labor tax rates should be U-shaped,
separating households with low and higher income distributions, instead of the previous proposed
lump-sum taxation (Mirrlees (1971)). Furthermore, Aiyagari (1995) ensures that with incomplete
markets and uncertainty, optimal capital taxation is positive.
In this manner, the present article pretends to answer quantitatively how SBTC and taxation
changes account for the paths of income inequality in the U.S from 1980 to 2010. Our contribution
is similar to Krusell et al. (2000). The authors show that capital-skill complementary changes ac-
count for most of the variations on the skill premium. Other related studies also measure wage
inequality through skill premium (Heckman et al. (1998)). We focus instead in the entire in-
come distribution, and see how much of the increase in income inequality can be accounted by
investment-specific technological change (ISTC).
The model developed in this framework is an overlapping generations economy, with incom-
plete markets where agents face a persistent uninsurable income shock and a borrowing limit.
Agents are also born with different skills, where one type is complementary with capital and the
other substitutable. Investment-specific technological change will thus generate inequality by in-
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creasing the skill premium. Parallel to the increase in the skill premium, we could also observe
a drastic decrease in labor income progressivity (see Figure 5) during the Reagan Administration,
precisely at the start of our period of analysis. We also replicate the level and progressivity of the
income tax schedule in order to study how much can these changes account for the increase in
post-tax income inequality that we observe.
Our model reproduces simultaneously some phenomenon of the U.S. economy from 1980 to
2010, namely: the skill premium rise; a growth in income and wealth inequality; a rise in skilled
labor share, and a reduction on the unskilled labor share. We were able to account for 48% of the
total change in income inequality. In particular, we show that SBTC alone account for 42%, while
taxation alone accounted for 5,7%.
The rest of the work is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss some related literature
and empirical facts. In Section 3, we present the model and the calibration method and in Section
4 the results. Section 5, concludes the work.
2 Related literature and facts
It is quite a consensus that labor share has been declining since 1980 (Eden and Gaggl (2018);
Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013)). Some recent models attribute the labor share contraction to
the substitutability between capital and unskilled labor in the technological production function.
This substitution in the course of investment-specific technological change has been referred as
automation.
Particularly, Eden and Gaggl (2018) calibrate an aggregate production function that highlights
the interaction between information and communication technology (ICT) and different types of
labor for the U.S. economy and find that the decline in the aggregate labor share is explained by
the decrease in routine occupations, since the income share of non-routine labor has been rising 1.
1It is very important to distinguish between occupation and worker skill type. Some professions are non-routine,
although they do not infer a skilled household, i.e., an educated household, for example, an electrician does not have a
college degree, although performs a non-routine job. Contrary, diagnosis doctors are skilled, but they perform a routine
occupation. Most of the routine occupations are conducted by agents that have a college degree or higher.
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For instance, automation can create distinct effects on the economy. On the one hand, it can
increase the aggregate welfare, because it pushes up productivity and, as a result, the factor prices
change (Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018); Eden and Gaggl (2018))2. But on the other hand, as
capital becomes cheaper, or in other words, as investment prices decline, unemployment rates will
increase due to a shift in companies’ factor demand, which will raise the demand for skilled people
and reduce the demand for unskilled people (Acemoglu and Restrepo (2016)). As demand-supply
rule takes place, unskilled households will see their wages decrease, although skilled agents will
face an increase in their salaries.
In fact, U.S. wage structure shows that since 1970 there is an increase in dispersion in house-
hold earnings, especially in different levels of education, age, and experience. Furthermore, Katz
et al. (1999) mentioned that the observed wage structure for U.S. seems to translate an increase in
inequality. The author summarises several reasons that are attributed to wage inequality: (i) higher
demand for more educated people driven by SBTC; (ii) loss in the wage premium paid to less edu-
cated people, due to a rising globalisation pressure; (iii) higher dispersion in skills, due to increase
of unskilled immigration; (iv) and changes in wage setting norms.
As a consequence, households will pursue different behaviors when they face income risk.
Agents can create an ex-ante response, i.e., in anticipation of the shock they tend to increase their
precautionary savings and engage in contracts in which wages are kept constant (Krueger et al.
(2016)). Or, after they face a shock, i.e., as an ex-post response to risk, households will make a
consumption revision, which will be lower if the income shock is negative, or higher otherwise
(Heathcote et al. (2014)). To smooth the shocks, households can change their skills, this is, they
can increase their human capital, becoming skilled (Heathcote et al. (2017)).
The U.S. wage pattern is related to technological development because periods of significant
technological developments are correlated with high skill premiums. Indeed, SBTC increased the
demand for skilled workers since 1980, and this increase explains part of the rise in education wage
2Indeed, Krusell et al. (2000) concludes that the increase in inequality occurs jointly with the reduction of the invest-
ment prices and recently Eden and Gaggl (2018) shows that the value of information and communication technology
falls considerably after 1982.
4
premium. Furthermore, the more demanded occupations in 2026 will be those that are less likely
to be automated and will be more related to social skills, creative thinking, and problem-solving
capacities. These non-routine occupations are related primarily with high-skilled jobs which need
higher levels of education and have more significant earnings.
Figure 1 presents a projection for the growing job positions for 2026, which shows that to have
access to most of them it is necessary to incorporate in distinct levels of education. In reality, most
of those occupations will require college degrees.
These recent projections support Heckman et al. (1998) who introduce human capital accumu-
lation in an OLG model in order to explain the rise in the wage inequality, measured by the skill
premium, without giving an unique role to capital, and conclude that the higher demand for high
skilled labor induces a supply response, thus more and more people will go to college as a response
to the required features.
Figure 1: Occupations change for 2026. The chart on the left presents the less demand jobs, and the right figure
shows the most demand jobs, where 0 indicates that there is no need for formal education credential; 1 indicates that
it is necessary a high school diploma; 2 indicates that it is necessary a Bachelor’s degree; 3 for Master’s degree; and 4
for Doctoral and advanced degree. Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
The skill premium can be seen as an explanatory variable for the decreasing labor share in the
course of SBTC. Murphy and Welch (1992) calculated that the skill premium grows 3,3% each
year, ceteris paribus. Furthermore, Krusell et al. (2000) show that there was a decline in 1970 in
the skill premium, but in 1980 there was a severe increase. Figure 2 is the representation for the
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skill premium since 1980 for the U.S. economy, which shows that there is, indeed, an increase that
was maintained until 2010, although since then it has been quite steady. The more considerable
difference is coming from the college skill premium, calculated as the ratio for bachelor degrees
and high school degrees. This problematic of income polarization may continue to increase due to
the higher demand for high-wage occupations that can grow more than middle-wage jobs.
As this trend continues, the problem can appear because not everyone has the same opportunity
to access to higher education. Thus, inequality surges, because automation leads to unemployment
in low-skilled people (Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018)) and because wealthier agents tend to be
more educated and older (Krueger et al. (2016)).
Figure 4 compares the Gini Index for pre-tax and post-tax income and shows that inequality is
rising since 1980. Thus, although taxes are taking influence in reducing inequality, it seems that
this has not been entirely effective. Indeed, the income share of the bottom 90% is dropping in
the same period. Of course, distinct levels of income correspond to different levels of experience,
skills, and productivities, as it will be clarified in section 3.
Taxation can be a force to increase output and consumption because it affects government
spending (Ferriere and Navarro (2014)). The Mirrlessian approach concludes that individuals with
highest skills have optimal taxation of zero (Diamond (1998)). However, recent studies show that
there are welfare gains when we move to a non-linear tax function especially when the government
does not observe the skills of the citizens (Gorry and Oberfield (2012)). Thus, the government
should set different taxation on workers with different abilities and, in consequence, with different
elasticities towards capital. Heathcote et al. (2010) find that the optimal income taxation structure
to maximize social welfare is only a two-parameter function, that embraces the level of taxation
and the progressivity of tax, as it will be clarified in section 3. Using this, and also, other income
taxation approaches, Guner et al. (2014) find that it is possible to reduce the Gini Index from 0,56
to 0,55 only by using labor taxation.
Although this is a useful measure to reduce income inequality, taxation can create an adverse
effect. As the government increases progressive taxation, agents have less incentive to work, and
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they prefer to invest less in skills, which can create even more heterogeneity (Golosov et al. (2016);
Heathcote et al. (2017); Stiglitz (1982)).
Progressive taxation is essential to redistribute after-tax income across ex-ante heterogeneous
households. Thus an optimal policy can create beneficial effects on society. Krueger et al. (2013)
found optimal labor taxation of 34,1% taking into account skilled and unskilled households and,
concluded that this taxation leads to a lower Gini index, higher GDP and consumption, and more
people deciding to go to college.
Figure 5 shows the results for labor tax progressivity in the U.S. since 1946 using the method-
ology of Ferriere and Navarro (2014). The average progressivity tax is 11,9% (s.e. 0,029) between
1980 and 2010. In the 80’s progressive tax rate achieved its maximum, however since the 90’s the
progressivity tax has been established close to 10%, resulting in a decrease comparing 1980 with
2010.
Figure 2: Log Skill premium. Calculated as the ratio between skill and unskilled wages. Skilled wages are considered
for those who have a bachelor degree, or higher and unskilled wages are those coming from a high-school degree. Own
calculation. Data source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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Figure 3: Division of people that completed High school and College with 25 years and over, the lines are the number
of people that completed these degrees divided by 1×108. Data source: Census Bureau.
Figure 4: Inequality. Data source: World Inequality Database (WID).
Figure 5: Progressive taxation. Own calculation following the method of Ferriere and Navarro (2014). More details
on annexes.
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3 Methodology
3.1 Model
The model used is an incomplete markets economy with uninsurable idiosyncratic risk and het-
erogeneous agents. There are two types of households that derive utility from consumption and
leisure. Skilled agents born with particular abilities, such as intelligence, creativity, and physical
force, that allow them to execute tasks that are a complement to capital. On the other hand, unskilled
households have attributes that enable them to substitute capital. Both types face an idiosyncratic
uninsurable stream in the form of wages and make joint decisions about their consumption, savings
and hours worked. The model is based on Brinca et al. (2016) and has a bequest motive such as
Brinca et al. (2018) and Brinca et al. (2019).
Demographics
The economy is populated by J-1 overlapping generations. Households make their labor deci-
sion at 20 years old and finish their work life at 65 when they retire. Such as in Brinca et al. (2016)
households have an age-dependent probability of dying, pi( j) and, consequently an age-dependent
probability of surviving ω( j) = 1−pi( j), where pi(100) = 1. Furthermore, the economy will be
composed by
q=J−1
∏
q=80
ω(q) retired households, at any given period.
Technology
The economy behaves in perfect competition with constant elasticity of substitution (CES) pro-
duction function that uses three inputs: capital (K), skilled (S) and unskilled labor (NS). Zt is an
intermediate good and Yt is the aggregated production function, as it is specified:
Yt = F(Zt ,NNSt ,N
S
t ) = At((φ1Zt+(1−φ1)NNS,
σ−1
σ
t )
σ
σ−1 (1)
Zt = (φ2Ak,tK
ρ−1
ρ
t +(1−φ2)N
S, ρ−1ρ
t )
ρ
ρ−1 (2)
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where At is the technology level, Ak,t is augmented technological level, φ1 describes the share of
the composite factor, φ2 is the share of capital, ρ is the elasticity of substitution between capital and
skilled labor and σ is the elasticity of substitution between composite factors and unskilled labor.
This doubled-nested production function inserts the single-nested specification where the skilled
labor is directly complemented with capital and, unskilled labor is substitutable with composite
factors, this is simular with Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013) and Krusell et al. (2000)3. Thus, the
law of capital motion can be given as:
Kt+1 = (1−δ )Kt+Xt (3)
where δ comes for capital depreciation and Xt for the gross investment.
Labor income
Households are the labor suppliers, and they are different among them. Each household faces
different discount factors, different permanent abilities, different persistent idiosyncratic shocks,
and different asset holdings. Moreover, retired households receive a benefit that is given by the
government.
Households’ productivity will depend on their age, j, permanent ability, a ∼ N(0,σ2ε ), which
determines if an agent is able to provide skilled or non-skilled labor, and an idiosyncratic produc-
tivity shock, u, which follows an AR (1) process, such as:
u′ = ρuu+ ε,ε ∼ N(0,σ2ε ) (4)
Furthermore, wages will be given as:
w( j,a,u) = wseγ1 j+γ2 j
2+γ3 j3+a+u,s ∈ {S,NS} (5)
3Other specification form can be used, although Eden and Gaggl (2018) states that regardless the specification used
both are credible to capture the interaction between factors.
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where γ determines the age profile of wages and wS determines the wages per efficiency unit of
the individual 4. It is important to mention that college education will affect the household labor
earnings through wages and a distinct age profile of wages, although it will not affect through an
increase in the efficiency unit endowment.
Preferences
Households utility depend on consumption and work time and it is given by:
U(c,n) =
cσ−1
1−σ −χ
n1+η
1+η
(6)
where χ is the notation for disutility if work and η denotes Frisch labor elasticity. As in many
macroeconomic models this is a CRRA utility function in order to be able to produce a balanced
growth. Retired households face an additional benefit on their income:
D(k) = ϕ log(k) (7)
Government
The government has a balanced budget and collects revenues to supply the economy with public
goods and benefits. Revenues from social security are flat and come from the part of the employer
and the employee to finance the retirement benefits, Ψt .
The government also taxes consumption and capital at constant rates. The labor tax function
follows a non-linear form as suggested by Benabou (2002), that incorporates heterogenous house-
holds, and diverse studies confirm that it is a good fit for U.S. data (Guner et al. (2014); Heathcote
et al. (2014)):
ya = 1−θ1y−θ2 (8)
4Haider and Solon (2006) conclude that there are three stages of lifetime earnings. First exists an initial linear
growth until the age of 35; then, from 35 until 50 the authors do not observe any linear growth and, finally, at age 50
there is observed a wage decline.
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where ya is the post government income, y is the pre-tax labor income or money income. Parameter
θ1 determines the level of taxation and θ2 determines the progressivity of the tax. In this sense, it
is possible to see that when the progressivity is null, θ2 = 0, the tax rate will be flat, such that
ya = 1− θ1 , thus the marginal and average tax rates are equal and this will capture a rise in the
overall level of taxation. Hence, if θ2 = 1 the labor tax function infers complete redistribution;
however, when θ2 > 0(< 0) it implies that the taxation system is progressive (regressive), since
marginal rates surpass (are under) average rates.
All tax revenues are used by the government to finance the supply of public goods, Gt , public
debt interest expenses, rtBt , and other lump-sum transfers, gt . Thus, the government budget con-
straint will be as follows, where RSSt is the social security revenues and Rt are other tax revenues.
gt
(
45+ ∑
j≥45
Ω j
)
= Rt−Gt− rtBt (9)
Ψt
(
∑
j≥45
Ω j
)
= RSSt (10)
Equilibrium
Firms maximize their profits in a competitive equilibrium, thus factor prices will be equal to
their marginal products:
rt =
∂Yt
∂Kt
−δ = [Aσ−1t Yt ]
1
σ φ1Z
σ−ρ
σρ
t φ2
(
1
Kt
) 1
ρ
−δ (11)
wSt =
∂Yt
∂NSt
= [Aσ−1Yt ]
1
σ φ1Z
σ−ρ
σρ
t (1−φ2)
(
1
NSt
) 1
ρ
(12)
wNSt =
∂Yt
∂NNSt
= (1−φ1)
(
Aσ−1t Yt
NNSt
) 1
ρ
(13)
Furthermore, the household’s problem can be formulated recursively for a given period. Each
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household is defined by his age, j, asset position, k, time discount factors β ∈ {β1,β2}, permanent
ability, a, persistent idiosyncratic shock, u, and a time-constant ability to supply a specific labor
type s ∈ {S,NS}. Giving his position the household chooses consumption, c, working hours, n,
and the assets holding, k′. The problem can be summarized in the following form, where YL is the
household labor income after taxes:
V ( j,k,β ,a,u) =max
c,k′,n
[U(c,n)+βEu′w( j)[V ( j+1,k′,β ,a,u′,s]]
s.t. c(1+ τc)+ k′ =

(k+Γ)(1+ r(1− τk))+g+Y L if j < 45
(k+Γ)(1+ r(1− τk))+g+Ψ if j ≥ 45
Y L =
nw( j,a,u)
1+ τ˜SS
(
1− τSS− τl
(
nw( j,a,u)
1+ τ˜SS
))
n ∈ [0,1],k′ ≥ k,k0 = 0,c> 0,n= 0if j ≥ 55
(14)
In this manner, the stationary recursive competitive equilibrium can be defined as follows,
where Φ( j,k,β ,a,u) is the stationary distribution of agents:
1. Taking factor prices and initial conditions as given, the value function V ( j,k,β ,a,u) and the
policy functions, c( j,k,β ,a,u), k′( j,k,β ,a,u) and n( j,k,β ,a,u) solve the household’s optimiza-
tion problem.
2. Markets clear:
K+B=
∫
kdΦ
NS =
∫
a>a∗
ndΦ
NNS =
∫
a≤a∗
ndΦ
∫
cdΦ+δK+G= Y
3. Factor prices are equal to the marginal productivities as shown in equations (11), (12) and
(13).
13
4. The government budget balances:
g
∫
dΦ+G+ rB=
∫ (
τkr(k+Γ)+ τcc+nτl
(
nw(a,u, j)
1+ τ˜SS
))
dΦ
5. The social security system balances:
Ψ
∫
j≥65
dΦ=
τ˜SS+ τSS
1+ τ˜SS
(∫
j<65
nwdΦ
)
6. The assets of the dead are uniformly distributed among the living:
Γ
∫
w( j)dΦ=
∫
(1−w( j))kdΦ
3.2 Calibration
The model is calibrated to match the U.S. economy in 1980, in light with the method used by
Brinca et al. (2016) and Brinca et al. (2018). Preferences and age profile of wages, ρu and σε are
setting according to Brinca et al. (2016). The first discount factor is set to match the capital-output
ratio in 1980 and the second discount factor is set to match the income share of the bottom 90%.
The distribution parameters, φ1 and φ2 are fixed to 0,55 and 0,8, respectively, so that the skill
premium and the quantities of labor supplied are close to levels observed in 1980 (Eden and Gaggl
(2018)). Furthermore, the elasticity of substitution between capital and skilled labor is 0,43, and
the elasticity of substitution between capital and unskilled labor is 2,33.
The disutility of work, χ , and the variance of ability, σa, are set using the Simulated Method of
Moments (SMM).
Furthermore, risk aversion was set to 1,2. We, also assume that capital depreciates at 0,06 and
the share of non-routine skills is set to 40%.
Wages
The wage profile through life-cycle represented by equation (5) is calibrated directly from the
data. We run equation (15) using data from Luxembourg Income and Wealth Study (LWS).
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ln(wi) = ln(w)+ γ1 j+ γ2 j2+ γ3 j3+ εi (15)
where j is the age of individual i. To calculate ρu and σε we use PSID data and regressed
equation (15), then we use the residuals in order to estimate both parameters. These parameters are
kept constant across steady-states 5.
Preferences
There has been an extensive debate in the literature relative to the value of Frisch elasticity
of labor supply, η . The estimates for η are comprehended between 0,5 to 26. We set the Frisch
elasticity to 1 as Trabandt and Uhlig (2011).
Taxation
As it is specified in section 3, we use the labour income tax function represented in equation
(8), to capture the progressively of both the tax schedule and government transfers. In order to
estimate θ1 and θ2 we follow the method of Ferriere and Navarro (2014). Thus we fix θ1 = 0,85
and θ2 = 0,16 for 1980. For 2010 the values of θ1 and θ2 are set to 0,87 and 0,095, respectively.
The rates for social security are set assuming no progressivity, the taxes on behalf for em-
ployer and employee are set to 7,65% for both steady states. Furthermore, capital taxation and
consumption taxation are set according to the values obtained by Mendoza et al. (1994), which are
τc = 5,4% and τk = 46,9%. For 2010 these values are 5,5% and 36% for consumption and capital,
respectively, following Brinca et al. (2016).
Endogenous calibrated parameters
Since some parameters do not have an empirical counterpart, they are calibrated using SMM.
These parameters are calibrated to match the target values in Brinca et al. (2016), as in Table 1. We
choose β1, β2, χ , σa and ϕ to minimize the loss function:
L(β1,β2,χ,σa,ϕ) = ‖Mm−Md‖ (16)
5The values are: γ1 = 0,2647; γ2 =−0,00539 and γ3 = 0,000036;
ρu = 0,335;σε = 0,3066.
6For a more detailed view see Reichling and Whalen (2012).
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Mm is the moment in the data and Md refers the moments in the model. We have five instruments,
and five moments in the data to have an identified system. Table 2 displays the values of the
parameters calibrated by SMM.
Table 1: Calibration fit
Data moment Description Source Target Model value
K
Y Capital-to-output ratio Penn World Table 8.0 3,3 3,3
B90 Income share of the bottom 90% WID 0,3287 0,33
n¯ Fraction of hours worked OECD 0,3 0,3
IGini Income Gini WID 0,458 0,464
Q75−80/Qall Av wealth of 75-80/Av wealth of all LWS 1,513 1,51
Table 2: Parameters calibrated using SMM
Parameter Values Description Target
β1 0,27 Beta 1 KY
β2 1,0043 Beta 2 Income share of the bottom 90%
χ 8,3 Disutility of work Fraction of hours worked
σa 0,15 Variance of ability Income Gini
ϕ 13,43 Bequest motive Av wealth of 75-80/Av wealth of all
4 Results and Discussion
The supply of skills is shaped by many variables, such as demographic trends, preferences and
education shifts. Due to technological changes, workers may want to upgrade their skills, as the
skill demand increases. Initially, technical change was viewed as factor-neutral, this is, improve-
ments in the TFP leave marginal rates unchanged. However, empirically, we observe a rise in the
skill premium, as well as the increase in skilled labor supply, as we show in section 2. Even with
a higher supply of skilled people since 1970, wages for skilled people kept rising, which can be
observed as pieces of evidence of skill-biased technological change. In fact, Acemoglu and Autor
(2011) argue that technical changes are by its nature skill-biased.
Thus, some argue that the changes in production are not just an effect of the decrease in the price
of investment, but also an increase in the skill supply. As society keeps getting more educated,
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employers will prefer to use people’s ability to make them even more productive and, as they
gain experience they can be more profitable more rapidly than unskilled households. Furthermore,
skilled households have an advantage compared with unskilled households, since they give less
uncertainty to the employer.
For simplicity, most of the studies assume that production function elasticity of substitution
between capital and labor is equal to 1. However, recently, a departure from this assumption has
taken place. If the elasticity of substitution between capital and unskilled labor is higher than 1,
firms will substitute labor for capital. In this manner, we guarantee that the growth of skilled labor is
greater than the growth of unskilled labor. In this sense, if σ > 1, then the two inputs are substitutes.
Thus, the economy will be endogenously augmented through capital, because an increase in Ak,t
will increase the marginal productivity of capital. This effect occurs jointly with an increase in the
skill premium and marginal productivity of skilled labor. However the unskilled labor has lower
productivity. Contrary, if the elasticity of substitution between capital and unskilled labor is lower
than 1, the two factors will be complements and the demand shift will decrease the skill premium.
This goes according with the results reported by Acemoglu and Autor (2011), Autor et al. (2003),
Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013) and Krusell et al. (2000).
Krusell et al. (2000) show that the values for the elasticity of substitution between skilled labor
and capital are between 0 and 1,2 and the values for the elasticity of substitution between unskilled
labor and capital are between 0,5 and 3. Therefore, skilled labor and capital tend to be complements
and unskilled labor and capital tend to be substitutes. This interpretation has consequences for
taxation because taxes depend on the heterogeneous characteristics of the households. Hence,
agents with higher skill level should face higher taxes and unskilled households should face lower
taxes, i.e., the lower the substitution between factors the higher should be the tax rate imposed, and
vice-versa.
To capture the SBTC, we use capital-augmenting technology, Ak,t , as a substitute. We use an
elasticity of substitution for skilled labor and capital lower than 1. Thus these factors are comple-
ments. Contrary, we set an elasticity of substitution for unskilled labor and capital higher than 1,
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stating that these factors are substitutes.
Our experiments are as follows. First, we calibrated the model for the U.S. to match the capital-
output ratio, average hours, and moments of income and wealth distributions for 1980. Then, we
changed the tax system according to 2010 values, as referred in section 3. After this change, we
compute the changes in the total factor productivity (TFP) and skill-biased technological change to
replicate the growth in PIB per capita between 1980 and 2010. We follow Greenwood et al. (1997)
and keep the contribution the TFP and SBTC constant and equal to one-half 7.
With this model, we capture several aspects of the U.S. economy since 1980 to 2010, such
as: (i) rising skill premium; (ii) increase in income and wealth Gini coefficient; (iii) decrease in
the wealth share owned by the bottom 90% of families (iv) an increase in skilled labor share; (v)
a reduction in unskilled labor share; (vi) and, an increase in wage dispersion. Furthermore our
model recognises, as expected, that people spend more hours working and the supply of skilled
households increased in 2010, due to a decrease in progressive labor taxation.
Our model accounts for 48% of the total increase in the income Gini Index for the period.
Then, we access the contribution of changes in the tax system and changes in the investment-
specific technological change separately, by changing each factor at a time. We find that changes
in the tax system account for 5,7% of the total increase in income inequality, while changes in
investment-specific technological change account for 42%.
5 Conclusion
Most of the economists believe that the U.S. wage structure is influenced predominantly for tech-
nological shifts, especially since 1980. We use an overlapping generations model with incomplete
markets, where agents face persistent uninsurable income shock and a borrowing limit, featuring
skill-biased technological change. To generate SBTC we assume that agents born with different
abilities, whereby some are endowed with abilities that are complemented by capital and others
7With this approach the authors conclude that the growth in output is mostly explained by investment-specific
technological change.
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are endowed with capabilities that are substituted by capital, i.e., we use the substitution of un-
skilled labor for capital as a reasonable mechanism to explain the skill-biased technological change
(Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013); Krusell et al. (2000)).
We calibrated our model to match the U.S. economy in 1980 to answer quantitatively how
skilled-biased technological change and taxation explain income inequality in the U.S. from 1980
to 2010. The model captures the severe decrease in labour income progressive taxation; the rise
in the skill premium; the increase in income inequality; as well as the increase in the share of the
skilled population, opposing to the decrease in the share of unskilled labor. This shows that high-
skilled workers have, indeed, an advantage in the labor market because they give less uncertainty to
the employers. More importantly, we find that changes in taxation and capital-skill complementary
jointly account for 48% of the increase in income Gini. Furthermore, we find that SBTC account
for 42%, while taxation alone accounted for 5,7%.
An essential introduction to the model can pass for add an endogenous education choice in
light with A´braha´m (2008). Before entering in the economy, a household can observe its ability
and decide whether to begin to work as an unskilled worker or to attend college. This decision
will depend not only on the distribution of agents ability, but also on the initial wealth distribution,
taking into account a costly educational choice. Moreover, it is also possible to study an optimal
taxation across the transition path between steady-states.
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A Appendix
1. Tax function
8Given the tax function
ya= θ1y1−θ2
which we employ, the average tax rate is defined as:
ya= (1− τ(y))y
thus
θ1y1−θ2 = (1− τ(y))y
1− τ(y) = θ1y−θ2
τ(y) = 1−θ1y−θ2
T (y) = τ(y)y= y−θ1y1−θ2
T ′(y) = 1− (1−θ2)θ1y−θ2
8This first part of the appendix is borrowed by Holter et al. (2017)
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In this sense, the tax wedge for any two incomes (y1,y2) is given by
1− 1− τ(y2)
1− τ(y1) = 1−
(
y2
y1
)−θ2
(17)
and therefore independent of the scaling parameter θ1. In this manner, one can raise average
taxes by lowering θ1 and not the progressivity of the tax code, since the progressivity is uniquely
determined by the parameter θ2.
1.1. Labor tax function calculation
In order to estimate θ1 and θ2 we follow Ferriere and Navarro (2014). The authors calculated
the progressive tax rate as:
θ2 =
AMTR−ATR
1−ATR
We use data from Mertens and Montiel Olea (2018) for AMTR (Annual Marginal Tax Rate). ATR
(Annual Tax Rate) is equal to:
ATR= TotalTaxLiabilityTotalIncome
The data for Total Tax Liability is retrieved from Statistic of Income and Total Income data is
retrieved from Piketty and Saez (2003).
Noticing that AMTR is equal to the sum of AMIITR (Average Marginal Individual Income Tax
Rate ) and AMPTR (Average Marginal Payroll Tax Rate), the formula was changed using only
AMIITR, which incorporates solely tax rate series for the federal individual income tax, because
the presented model already incorporates the taxation for social security.
The level of tax rate can be seen as a quantitatively close measure of the average tax rate Ferriere
and Navarro (2014). Thus, if we use y = 1 we are assuming that the household income equals to
the mean income and we obtained the same values for both measures.
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Table 3: Tax function estimations
Year θ1 θ2 θ2 with AMTR
1980 0,849 0,159 0,354
2010 0,869 0,095 0,214
Table 4: Parameters held constant across steady states
Parameter Value Description Source
Tecnology
α 0,36 Capital share to output Literature
δ 0,06 Capital depreciation rate Literature
ρu, σε 0,335, 0,3066 u′ = ρuu+ ε,ε ∼ N(0,σ2ε ) PSID
Preferences
η 1 Inverse Frisch Elasticity Trabandt and Uhlig (2011)
σ 1,2 Risk aversion Literature
Taxation
τ˜SS, τSS 7,65% Social security taxes -
Table 5: Parameters change across steady states
Parameter Description 1980 2010
Taxation
τk Capital tax 0,469 0,36
τc Consumption tax 0,054 0,05
φ1 Level of labor tax 0,849 0,869
φ2 Progressivity of labor tax 0,159 0,095
1 For capital and consumption taxation in 1980 we use
the values from Mendoza et al. (1994) and for 2010 we
use the values from Brinca et al. (2016);
2 For labor taxes we use Ferriere and Navarro (2014)
method;
Table 6: Inequality measures
Parameter 1980 2010 Source
Inequality
Income Gini 0,4585 0,586 WID
Wealth Gini 0,8085 0,8842 WID
Bottom 90% 0,3287 0,243 WID
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